GEOFF BENNETT: Well, for perspective now, we turn to Alan Eyre.

He served in the U.S.

government for four decades and was part of the Obama administration's negotiating team for the Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump pulled out of back in 2018.

He's now at the Middle East Institute.

And Miad Maleki was born and raised in Iran.

Until last year, he was associate director for sanction targeting with a focus on Iran in the U.S.

Treasury Department.

He's now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Thank you both for being here.

Alan, we will start with you.

I think it might be helpful for our viewers to sort of reset the table.

Help us understand, what exactly has been agreed to and by whom?

ALAN EYRE, Middle East Institute: Well, I think what's been agreed to is cease-fire for two weeks.

And on the one hand, U.S.

and Israel have to obey, on the other hand, Iran.

It's not clear whether this extends to Israel stopping attacks in Lebanon, which is one of the 10 points that Israel had in its proposal.

Unclear.

But, to me, the key unknown variable is, how much does Iran let loose of its choke hold on the Strait of Hormuz, which has become the single most important piece of strategic leverage it has?

I'm, frankly, surprised that they agreed to this cease-fire.

And two weeks from now, we will see whether they're willing to relinquish it in perpetuity, which I would be surprised at.

GEOFF BENNETT: How realistic is this in the short term, do you think, Iran reopening the strait?

MIAD MALEKI, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies: I think it is.

I would disagree with -- and I would argue that they needed the cease-fire more than any other party to this conflict.

I mean, their economy is bankrupt.

They rely on the Strait of Hormuz more than any other nations in the Gulf.

So, I think they wanted a cease-fire.

I'm not surprised that they agreed to some sort of cease-fire.

We don't know what those 10 points are.

We have seen some reports that some of those 10 points are things that I don't think the U.S.

government is going to agree to, such as sanctions relief or some kind of a provision of financial incentives to Iran for the flow of commerce through the State of the Union.

It could be some watered-down version of the 10 points.

It could be a new set of 10 points that Iran proposed.

So we have to wait and see where those 10 points are.

But, at this point, again, I think the Iranian regime is coming out of this in a lose-lose kind of situation.

They accept the cease-fire.

They have to accept the reality of the domestic pressure, a broken economy, and a political situation that is very dire.

They have lost their top layers of leadership.

And it's unclear if they can actually communicate between different provinces with different parts of government.

And if they did not accept the cease-fire, then they're going to keep losing militarily and politically and economically.

GEOFF BENNETT: And, Alan, in the TRUTH Social post from President Trump this evening, he says: "We have already met and exceeded all military objectives."

What were those objectives?

And is his assessment widely shared?

ALAN EYRE: Prior to that, I'd like to point out one thing, and I could be wrong, but Iran's ships were still going through the Straits of Hormuz.

So they were still making money.

They were controlling the flow of traffic, but not stopping all of it.

So, economically, they weren't suffering that much.

They were in fact making more.

And your question was?

GEOFF BENNETT: When the president says, we have already met and exceeded our military objectives.

ALAN EYRE: Oh, yes.

He has.

I mean, Israel and the U.S.

have both said repeatedly, our goal was to deny Iran the ability to project power past its borders.

They have done that.

They have taken out the navy.

They have taken out the air force.

They have hurt much of Iran's defense industrial base, destroyed many of the petrochemical plants that made precursors, essential for rocket fuel, missile fuel, taken out the nuclear centers.

But what they didn't do, the unintended consequences, they allowed Iran to discover a new strategic lever.

And that's control of the strait.

So, in many ways, control of the strait has supplanted the latent threat of Iran going nuclear in terms of a possible future strategic deterrent.

GEOFF BENNETT: And the military might, in and of itself, isn't enough leverage to ensure that the strait stays open?

ALAN EYRE: Whose, the Western military might?

GEOFF BENNETT: Yes.

ALAN EYRE: No, it's not, because it takes relatively little to close the straits.

All you have to do is spook the insurance market.

And that's a fast attack craft and a guy holding an RPG, right?

It doesn't take a massive navy to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, to hit a ship.

So that's the problem.

All it takes is a couple of drones, which are cheap to make.

Iran has lots of them, or, even worse, as I said, someone in a fast attack craft, and you have so cowed the international insurance markets that they're not going to provide insurance, without which ships won't go through the strait.

GEOFF BENNETT: Miad, do you see a framework here for a lasting peace, something more durable?

MIAD MALEKI: I don't think you can see that with this regime.

And just kind of responding very quickly to your point, there's some limited number of tankers, Iranian tankers that moved through the Strait of Hormuz.

But the fact is, Iranian regime cannot repatriate any of this revenue that it generates from oil.

It's unclear if the oil that moves outside the Strait of Hormuz is actually being picked up by buyers.

There's now Venezuela oil in the market.

There's more Russian oil that is now available to some of the buyers, giving some of the relief that was provided recently.

So, back to your question, I think it's -- with this regime, a lasting peace or agreement is just not -- you're not going to see that.

I think they're -- especially given the fact that they're domestically under so much pressure, they're going to have to look for some kind of another conflict.

If you go back historically, in the '80s, Iran-Iraq war gave Iranian regime some kind of a few years of relief domestically to kind of operate in that state of war.

They have that right now.

With the ending of the strikes and the campaign, they're going to have to face a reality that, domestically, they're not really considered legitimate by the people.

They don't have the support domestically.

We can see how another round of protests in Iran and the regime might go back to posing threat to external adversaries.

GEOFF BENNETT: Well, to your point, as I understand it, the last line of the Iranian statement reads, "Our hand remains upon the trigger," which you would interpret in what way?

MIAD MALEKI: I think they're going to maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz.

They have had this for years.

That's not going to change.

They're not going to agree to any kind of deal that would push them away from what they're able to do in the Strait of Hormuz.

But, as I said, their import relies on the Strait of Hormuz.

Their export, getting oil out, depends on the Strait of Hormuz.

Regardless of if they can sell the oil or not, they have to get the oil out, so they can continue to extract oil.

So they really depend on the Strait of Hormuz.

They're going to continue to pose that threat.

GEOFF BENNETT: And, Alan, what fault lines remain at this point?

ALAN EYRE: Well, the fact that both sides' minimal demand of the other are so far apart, that it will take serious and sustained negotiations for any sort of chance of a solution.

And this is not something the U.S.

has really done, this administration, before.

They have a type of strategic attention deficit disorder.

They want to move on to something else.

So I just hope that they dedicate the people, the expertise and the time.

There was a recent story in the press that said that Mr.

Witkoff and Mr.

Kushner told President Trump, in essence, yes, we could probably reach a deal, but it would take a few months.

Well, that's great.

Let's dedicate those few months and get a deal.

GEOFF BENNETT: And, lastly, what do you make of Pakistan's role in all of this?

Why have they emerged as the key mediator?

ALAN EYRE: Well, there were seven countries trying to mediate.

There was Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar and Oman.

That's five, sorry.

They did a great job.

I mean, to a large extent, any country that has the minimal mutual relations with the U.S.

and Iran would suffice.

Pakistan did the job.

I mean, what matters is partly who's mediating, but, more importantly, the message is being passed, not the tube they're being passed in.

So I commend Pakistan for doing a great job, but the key roles are not going to be whoever mediates.

And, ideally, I'd like no mediation.

I'd like both sides talking to each other.

That's what we did in the JCPOA, not two or three hours every couple of weeks, all day, every day, until you reach an agreement.

GEOFF BENNETT: Alan Eyre, Miad Maleki, thank you both for your insights and perspectives.

ALAN EYRE: Thank you.